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In October 2000, Berlin’s Minister of Culture Christoph Stölzl proposed a merger of the 
city’s opera houses. In the midst of German reunification, Berlin was struggling financially 
and the cost of three separate opera houses was too much for the city to bear. This proposal 
to combine the former East-German Staatsoper Berlin and Komishe Oper with the former 
West-German Deutsche Oper under the administration of “The Opera Stages of Berlin” was 
met with public backlash. Newspapers all over the world reported daily as the directors of 
both the Staatsoper and Deutsche Oper—Daniel Barenboim and Christian Thielemann—
fought bitterly for their respective ensembles. This work aims to place the failed merger and 
its public uprising in a broader context of German musical competition. The Staatsoper and 
Deutsche Oper have been in competition for resources and prestige since their inception. 
More importantly, these rival ensembles and their separate identities have fought to define 
“Germanness” in a cultural context. Through the use of newspapers, archival documents and 
personal interviews, this thesis argues that despite popular opinion, the “German Opera 
Wars” is not a fight between leftover east and west mentalities and loyalties. Instead, the 
Opera Wars represent a culture of competition in music, as well as the enduring quest to 
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Which reminds me, did you know that in Rostock and Kiel they have 
founded a school of Low German poetry, or rather, two schools because 
when we Germans start anything they always split into two at once? 
Hardly was the Low German school started than we had another itio in 
partes and so the Mecklenbergers are parading under their leader Fritz 
Reuter and the Holsteiners under Klaus Groth. But Klaus Groth has 
stolen a march on the other because he is a lyric poet who can be set to 
music and everything depends on that. Before twelve months, no, 
before six months are out, there won’t be a single piano without a song 
of his perched on it all the time. 
 









Das uns're Meister sie gepflegt 
grad' recht nach ihrer Art, 
nach ihrem Sinne treu gehegt, 
das hat sie echt bewahrt: 
blieb sie nicht adlig, wie zur Zeit, 
da Höf' und Fürsten sie geweiht, 
im Drang der schlimmen Jahr' 
blieb sie doch deutsch und wahr; 
und wär' sie anders nicht geglückt, 
als wie wo alles drängt und drückt, 
ihr seht, wie hoch sie blieb im Ehr': 
was wollt ihr von den Meistern mehr? 
 
Drum sag' ich euch: 
ehrt eure deutschen Meister! 
Dann bannt ihr gute Geister; 
und gebt ihr ihrem Wirken Gunst, 
zerging' in Dunst 
das heil'ge röm'sche Reich, 
uns bliebe gleich 
die heil'ge deutsche Kunst! 
 
That our Masters have cared for it  
rightly in their own way, 
cherished it truly as they thought best, 
that has kept it genuine: 
if it did not remain aristocratic as of old, 
when courts and princes blessed it, 
in the stress of evil years 
it remained German and true; 
and if it flourished nowhere 
but where all is stress and strain, 
you see how high it remained in honour - 
what more would you ask of the Masters? 
… 
  
Therefore I say to you: 
Honour your German Masters, 
then you will conjure up good spirits! 
And if you favour their endeavours, 
even if the Holy Roman Empire 
should dissolve in mist, 
for us there would yet remain 
holy German Art  








It was a sunny, summer afternoon in Schöneberg. We were seated on the small balcony 
drinking coffee, as the record of Wolf Biermann that had been playing in the other room came to 
a stop. Eva and Wolfgang took this opportunity to reminisce about their younger days as Green 
Party activists and the series of protests they attended at the Wall. These sorts of reflective 
academic discussions were a regular and central part of my first visit to Berlin. As both Eva and 
Wolfgang had worked most of their lives as teachers—Eva as Theaterlehrerin and Wolfgang as 
Geschichtslehrer— together they had extensive knowledge of German history and culture. It was 
through their knowledge and memories that I was introduced to the political significance of 
German music. Wolfgang, as a self-proclaimed political activist and rebel of the late 1960’s and 
early 1970’s lauded the political influence of music. Artists like Konstantin Wecker and Wolf 
Biermann, he claimed, truly shaped the culture and identity of modern Germany.  
As a classically trained violinist, I was intrigued by the idea of music as a cornerstone of 
German identity. However, the music I associated with German culture was that of Bach, 
Beethoven, Schumann, and Wagner. Nonetheless it seemed, that recent discussion of German 
music and arts focused primarily on aspects of pop culture, such as the 2007 film Lives of 
Others, or iconic musicians such as Wolf Biermann and David Hasselhoff. While these cultural 
elements are certainly significant in a discussion of Germany’s post-reunification identity, it is 
important to remember that Germany’s legacy of linking identity to music extends far beyond the 
Cold War. Investigating the post-reunification fate of ensembles that have been a part of German 
society for over a century revealed another obstacle facing the ongoing process of reunification 
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and identity reconstruction. While single musicians, like Biermann, demonstrate a reaction to 
relevant political problems through music, long-established ensembles like the Deutsche Oper 
and the Staatsoper Berlin demonstrate a history of adaptation that parallels Germany’s own 
political and social changes.  
As I began my research into ensembles in Germany’s musical capital, Berlin, I came 
across a rather unique event. In October 2000, a proposal for two of Berlin’s major Opera 
Houses to merge under the umbrella of “The Opera Stages of Berlin” was met with extreme 
public backlash. After reunification, Germany was left with multiples of most vital institutions, 
including state-funded ensembles. Thus, cost-managing strategies such as combining two similar 
or identical organizations was commonplace and frankly, a necessary part of life after 
reunification. Despite the seemingly routine nature of institutional mergers, the public, as well as 
well-known public figures such as conductor Daniel Barenboim and former Minister of Culture 
(Kultusminister) Ulrich Roloff-Mormin publically denounced the merger.  
While initially these reactions seem overblown, it is worth noting that the two main 
operas that this merger would have affected were the Staatsoper Berlin—the prestigious former 
East-German opera house and the Deutsche Oper Berlin—the equally esteemed former West-
German opera house. These opera houses had vastly different backgrounds, repertoire, and 
audiences, even after reunification. Over a decade after reunification, former West-Germans 
remained loyal to the Deutsche Oper while former East-Germans exclusively visited the 
Staatsoper. This sense of loyalty and belonging to a specific opera house is very telling in 
relation to cultural identity. The significant differences between these two ensembles, as well as 
their audiences is a sign that the backlash against the merger was about much more than program 
cuts and funding. The failure of the merger can be interpreted as a representation of German 
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national identity. For centuries, historians and German people alike have associated German 
music with German identity. That ensembles of a previously divided Germany with distinct 
cultural identities would oppose a merger is not surprising. But, to it is a mistake to reduce this 
unwillingness to an identity crisis unique to reunification. Institutional competition has been 
central to Germany’s music and general culture for centuries. As Theodore Fontane describes in 
the above excerpt, whether in poetry or music, German cultural institutions cannot seem to help 
their tendency towards competitive division.  The separation of East and West Germany 
encouraged competition between ensembles on each side instead of continuing the competition 
between regional ensembles. In this way, the Cold War altered the existing pattern of 
competition to reflect the sociopolitical conflict of the times, but did not create a new rivalry. 
Similarly, the public reaction to the merger is not representative of a new national identity crisis, 
merely a continuation of regional competition and pride. Thus the failed merger between the 
Staatsoper and Deutsche Oper is the result of a pattern of institutional competition that has 
always played a central role in German cultural politics.  
	
§ 
The link between German identity and music has always been strong, almost taking on 
the form of myth, even when Germany’s evolving political structure was fragmented. For 
centuries, the legacies of Handel, Beethoven, Brahms, Mendelssohn, Schumann, Schubert and 
countless others have contributed to German pride in cultural creativity and musical excellence. 
Today, reunified Berlin serves as Germany’s political capital, but it has been Germany’s 
longtime musical capital. Berlin is the only city in the world that boasts six professional 
symphony orchestras, three opera houses, two musical conservatories, and various other musical 
institutions.  In 1929, Berlin was recognized as “the musical capital of the civilized world…its 
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prestige founded on the music of the past and flourishing still….”1 Despite the political turmoil 
of the Second World War and the physical separation of the Cold War, seventy years later, 
musicians still described a position in a Berlin ensemble as, “like dying and going to heaven.”2 
Some claim that associating German identity with music goes far beyond the various 
famed composers that called Germany home. German identity has always been somewhat of a 
nebulous topic, largely because of the long absence of a German nature. “Germany,” until 1871, 
was a collection of separate states. Even then, German-speaking areas like Austria were 
excluded. In many ways, the creation of the German Empire served as a solution to the identity 
crisis. As Barbara Eichner points out, the terminology of identity and identity politics is quite 
subjective. For her “Germany,” “denotes the German-speaking regions and their culture in a 
broad sense, in order to distinguish them from the political entities.”3 Therefore, a “German” is, 
“everybody who made a point about considering him or herself as part of the larger German 
linguistic, historical, cultural, or ethnic community, whichever state or region they actually 
belonged to.”4 The vague nature of these terms reveals a central issue which hampered the 
formation of a national German identity. Quite simply, “many Germans felt part of a German 
nation long before acquiring a German nation state.”5 There is an implicit separation between 
“German” as a cultural concept as compared with “German” as a political concept. As Eichner 
indicates, many Germans felt a sense of cultural belonging to the then hazy concept of Germany 
																																																						
1 Elizabeth Janik, “The Symphony of a Capital City: Controversies of Reunification in Berlin’s 
Music Community,” in Berlin: the Symphony Continues, ed. Carole- Anne Costabile- Heming 
(Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 2004), 247. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Barbara Eichner, History in Might Sounds: Musical Constructions of German National Identity 




while still maintaining skepticism about its political reality. Friedrich Schiller, in The German 
Empire, demonstrates that this conflicted identification was prevalent as early as 1797: 
Deutschland? aber wo liegt es? Ich weiß das Land nicht zu finden Wo das 
gelehrte beginnt, hört das politische auf. (Germany? But where is it located? I do 
not know how to find the country. Where the learned [Germany] begins the 
political ends)6 
 
Seventy-four years later, the creation of the German Empire effectively validated the 
“Germanness” of thousands unsure of their identity, though not even definitive boundaries and a 
political system still could not solve the “identity crisis.” Austria, a state that has long been tied 
to “Germanness,” especially through its music was excluded from this “new Germany.” 
Friedrich Nietzsche, three years after the creation of the German Empire remarked on the 
unsettled nature of the identity problem, “It is characteristic of the Germans that the question 
‘what is German?’ never dies out among them.”7 At this point, the opportunity for music to play 
a vital role in defining a German identity becomes clear. Though French and Italian music 
traditions had dominated the previous centuries, the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century 
marked a turning point in the German music tradition, “Concert societies and amateur choirs 
sprang up everywhere, music journals offered guidance on what to listen to and how to relate to 
music, while a thorough musical education became the hallmark of a cultivated middle-class 
upbringing.”8 
In the midst of political uncertainty and turmoil, music acted as a uniting factor 
throughout what would become German society. This musical “boom” was not just limited to 
individuals and communities. Various towns and cities built concert halls, cultivated orchestras, 
																																																						
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid., 1. 
8 Ibid., 7. 
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and employed composers, therefore building music into the local economy and creating a 
thriving industry. By the 1870s music had already been a long established foundation of both 
social and economic life in Germany. Paired with a wariness towards the political manifestations 
of the new German Empire, cultural association with music readily replaced national pride or 
identity.  
 But it could not do the work of political nationalism. Some scholars, like Eichner, argue 
that, unlike traditional realizations of nationalism, German musical nationalism (except under the 
Third Reich), “sailed under the flag of an apolitical universalism that served to assert German 
superiority all the more effectively.”9  But, by separating German musical “nationalism” during 
the Third Reich from the rest of German history, scholars like Eichner undermine their original 
claim. Music during the Third Reich was overtly nationalistic. Through a variety of political acts, 
music, literature and other various forms of propaganda, the SA imposed and celebrated an 
imagined German identity. Music and cultural institutions before and after the Third Reich were 
always decentralized and competitive, and thus not part of a larger national identity.10  
 Regional ensembles during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were a sign of wealth 
and prosperity and therefore, various towns and regions competed for recognition in part through 
the prestige of their ensembles. Similarly, many of the great composers included in the myth of 
German musical identity, like Mozart, Haydn and Schubert, were actually Austrian, while others, 
like Beethoven spent much of their lives in Vienna and other non-German territories. German 
national identity through music is a myth created by historians to solve a self-diagnosed identity 
crisis. Historian Stefan Berger, in his article on German Nation building argues that German 
																																																						
9 Ibid., 4. 
10 Phillip V. Bohlman, Focus: Music, Nationalism, and the Making of a New Europe (New York: 
Routledge, 2011), 86. 
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history during much of nineteenth century was intentionally written in a way that could support a 
unified nation.11 German music- or the imagined reality of German music- was employed for the 
same purpose. In the face of German political transition and strife through the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century, the arts transformed into a safer and stronger substitute for uniting Germans 
than fluid political ties. Football commentator Eric T. Hansen, calls this desirable alternative to 
national identification “das GoetheundSchillerding.”12 Through this overarching idea of a 
national culture, Germans who have never attended theater or read poetry can adopt a pretense of 
an identity to which they have no tangible connection.   
The imagined concept of German culture as “national” is undermined by the reality of 
German cultural institutions. German cultural institutions are, at their center, competitive. The 
previous excerpt from Thoedore Fontane’s Beyond Recall depicts this regional competition 
exactly. Baron von Arne’s description of the Low German school of poetry mirrors the fate of 
the Staatsoper and Deutsche Oper. Both sets of rivals fought to become the most prestigious, 
encouraged by the public rivalries between their leaders. Von Arne’s offhand comment, “when 
we Germans start anything they always split into two at once” rings particularly true in the 
context of German music and arts. Germany’s first attempt at a national theater in Hamburg 
demonstrates the failure of a national cultural institution due, at least in part, to rivalries.13 The 
National Theater in Hamburg, was founded in 1767 and ran only three short seasons before 
																																																						
11 Stefan Berger, “Building the Nation Among Visions of German Empire,” in Nationalizing 
Empires ed. Stefan Berger and Alexei Miller (New York: Central European University Press, 
2015), 247-308. 
12 Eichner, History in Might Sounds, 2.		
13  George W. Brandt and Wiebe Hogendoorn, German and Dutch Theater 1600-1848 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 198. 
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dissolving.14 Though this theater was part of Enlightenment efforts to define a national culture,  
it fell prey to competition from other performing groups in Hamburg.15  There were certainly 
other factors that contributed to the group’s failure, including poor organization, the unfavorably 
short Hamburg performance season, and finances; however, competition for top performers 
played the largest role. 16  The group suffered immensely when, “it had lost its best practitioners 
when Ackermann’s ballet master, the husband of Caroline Schulze quit the theater when his wife 
was driven out by Sophie Hensel’s intrigues, and he took the company’s best dancer, the young 
F. K.  Schroeder, with him; their mediocre replacements failed to prevent the decline.17 The 
competition between the grand experiment of a national theater and its rivals is something that is 
echoed throughout other cultural institutions, especially music. In the eighteenth century and 
nineteenth centuries, princes competed for the best ensembles. Later local governments 
maintained this practice.  
This is not to say that German culture is not rich or that German music is unremarkable. 
No, German artistic and musical culture is in fact as monumental as it is because of competition. 
As the various ensembles competed with each other for prestige, fame, and funding, the standard 
of performance increased. Thus, this competitive drive and subsequent level of excellence 
between cultural institutions is an inherent aspect of “Germanness.” The assertion that culture 
acted as a stand-in during periods of political strife is simply inaccurate, as political and social 
conflicts are reflected in the fates of musical institutions. As we shall see, the conflict between 
																																																						
14  H.B. Nisbet, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing: His Life, Works, and Thoughts (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 368.  
15 Brandt, German and Dutch Theater, 198.  
16 Nisbet, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, 371. 
17 Ibid.	
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the Deutsche Oper Berlin and Staatsoper Berlin in 2000 is simply one example of a much older 
tradition.   
§	
 Implicit in this case study of the failed “Opera Stages of Berlin” is the question of the 
state of post-reunification Germany’s national identity. I argue that the two are undeniably 
linked-though perhaps in a counterintuitive way. While the problems uniting these two 
ensembles stemmed from political insecurity and a lack of common cultural identity, these 
conditions did not create new or unique tensions between the ensembles. That the Cold War 
redefined German culture as a binary of East and West is central to the conflict. The culture 
surrounding each of these ensembles shifted to match the society it interacted with, therefore 
solidifying a culture that was distinctly East or West German. However, this is not the 
foundation of the conflict between the ensembles. A German culture of competition and the 
nearly century of rivalry between these groups motivated the backlash against the merger- not 
concepts of East and West Germanness. The Berlin Wall had created substantial cultural divides 
and separate identities that certainly added to the existing competition, but to view the 
separateness of these groups is not to be attributed to that alone. Though technical issues such as 
loss of funding and resources may have played a small role in the failed merger, the majority of 
the problems unifying stemmed from the implicit competition between institutions that had 
become a part of these ensembles’ cultures. 	  
The story will unfold as follows. The first act of this work will look at each respective 
ensemble at its inception as well as the historical context in which it was formed. The first act 
will have three scenes: Beginnings, the Third Reich, and the Cold War.  In each scene, the social 
and political events of the time determine how each group was perceived and ultimately affected 
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the culture and identity of the ensemble. The Staatsoper was originally founded in 1742 as part 
of Fredrick the Great’s court though its origins can be traced back to the sixteenth century. The 
Deutsche Oper, on the other hand, was a privately funded ensemble established in 1912 and only 
later appropriated by the German state. The social difference between eighteenth century Prussia 
and early twentieth-century Berlin are significant and therefore, even in their foundations, each 
group is completely distinct from the other. 
The next scene focuses on the Third Reich. The Staatsoper was nearly two hundred years 
old and the Deutsche Oper was barely twenty when Hitler took office. Though one might assume 
that the Deutsche Oper was more susceptible to influence due to its young age, the reality is that 
Nazi politics limited and redefined the works, interpretation, and artists that were allowed to 
participate in both ensembles. The Nazizeit had a profound impact on the cultures of both groups 
and in many ways, left a blank slate for the following years to truly redefine the character of the 
groups.  
The Cold War period is arguably the most influential on the personality and culture of 
each ensemble. While each Opera house’s past defined and made it a unique entity, the Cold War 
was the first time that the houses served populations that were both physically and intellectually 
separated. It was during this time that the ensembles truly disengaged culturally, as they no 
longer served a single society. Instead, as the policies and ministrations of both the Allies and the 
Soviet Union shaped each “half” of the divided Germany, the opera houses began to reflect the 
new identities of Germany.  
The second act, building on what has come before will focus primarily on dissecting the 
various perspectives of individuals involved in the Opera Stages of Berlin controversy. The deep 
roots of this conflict have not been addressed in scholarship. Historian Elizabeth Janik’s work on 
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German identity and music, as well as music and ensembles in Berlin has been influential to the 
development of my research and acts as a foundation for my exploration of the Berlin Opera 
Wars. But I have tried to dig deeper into the story. I have used newspapers—Die Berliner 
Zeitung , Der Taggespiegel, Der Süddeutsche Zeitung, Der Spiegel, and the Frankfurter 
Allgemeine—to gauge public opinion related to the merger as well as follow the rivalry between 
music directors Christian Thielemann and Daniel Barenboim. While this material is valuable in 
understanding the wide reaching implications of this merger in the political world and public 
sphere, it fails to capture the experience of individuals in the art community.  
To get at these perspectives, in March and July 2015, I interviewed various individuals 
who were members of the respective groups or knowledgeable about the event. By interviewing 
Berliner musicians and artists, I attempt to capture the reaction of musicians to the Opera Wars 
and foster a more complete understanding of reunification and the discourses surrounding the 
identities of each ensemble.  
As a final note, the names of the ensembles change repeatedly throughout the centuries-






















The competition between the Staatsoper and the Deutsche Oper only began in 1912, 
though Berlin’s opera tradition began much earlier. The Staatsoper was officially founded in the 
eighteenth century with a legacy that began much earlier. In contrast, the Deutsche Oper was a 
product of the early twentieth century and began as a privately funded ensemble with democratic 
leanings. The difference in backgrounds and closeness of proximity launched the ensembles into 
a competition in which the larger, more established Staatsoper had an advantage. This 
competition adapted to fit the political context of the time and would continue up to the present. 
The Third Reich forced each group to present themselves as the ideal representation of a national 
Germanness; their existing rivalry magnified by the competition between the Nazi officials who 
acted as their “benefactors.”  In contrast to the direct competition for funds and notoriety the 
groups experienced before the Cold War, the separation of the two Germanys meant that the 
groups no longer needed to be rivals. Yet, the separation of the Cold War also allowed the 
ensembles to rediscover their identities and incorporate the rhetoric of East and West 
Germanness. In this way, the competition took on a more ideological presence and forced each to 
answer the question “What is German? — a reflection process that had begun with the inception 
of the Staatsoper.  
The Staatsoper Berlin was founded in 1742 as the Royal Court Opera under Frederick the 
Great, though its origins extend as early as the sixteenth century. It grew out of the union of two 
separate groups— the Staatskapelle, which came first and an opera, which was created much 
later. The Staatsoper and the Staatskapelle were entirely separate entities. The Berlin 
13	
Staatskapelle (originally the Kürfurstliche Hofkapelle), was founded first as a court chapel by 
Kurfürst Joachim II of Brandenburg, Prince Elector of the Holy Roman Empire in 1570. 18 In this 
period, Berlin was a “double town;”19 in some ways rehearsing the separation imposed by the 
Berlin wall hundreds of years later. The Spree River separated Cölln on its western bank from 
Berlin (referred to here as Altberlin) on its eastern. Unlike the artificially created sectors of East 
and West Berlin after the Second World War, these sister cities constructed inland water 
transportation routes, bridges, and even a common town hall that fostered trade and mutual 
prosperity.20 While the Kürfurstliche Hofkapelle was based in Cölln, the wealth of these twin 
cities contributed to the success of the ensemble. By the early seventeenth century, the orchestra 
was one of the largest in Europe and had about thirty-seven players.21 Though the Thirty Years’ 
War severely damaged the ensemble, it slowly recovered and its opera counterpart was 
established in 1696 by Elector Fredrick III.22  
The start of the eighteenth century and Elector Fredrick III’s rule as King Fredrick I—
King in Prussia— brought about significant changes for both Berlin and its ensembles. In the 
twelve-year span between 1701 and 1713, the Kürfurstliche Hofkapelle was first expanded into 
the much larger Königliche Kapelle and then quickly reduced to a small orchestra for courtly 
musical engagements and a separate brass band used for hunting and parades under King 
Fredrick William I.23 The cities of Cölln-Altberlin were also radically transformed during this 
																																																						
18  Aryeh Oron, “Staatskapelle Berlin,” Bach-Cantatas, last modified May 2006, August 2010, 
www.bach-cantatas.com. 
19  Gordon A. Craig, The Germans (Westford: First Meridian Printing, 1983), 263. 
20 “The Medieval Trading Center,” Berlin.de: Das offizielle Haupstadt Portal, www.berlin.de.	
21 Oron, Staatskapelle Berlin.  
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid.  
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period. In 1710, King Fredrick I ordered that Cölln-Altberlin merge to form Berlin, the new 
capital of Prussia.24 
Fredrick the Great’s (Fredrick II) reign solidified the legacy and traditions of the 
Staatsoper. Not only did he bring in talented musicians to serve as Kapellmeister, such as Johann 
Joachim Quantz and Carl Philipp Emanuel Bach, but he also commissioned the construction of 
the Royal Opera House Unter den Linden. Architect Georg Wezeslaus von Knobelsdorff drew up 
the plans and construction began in July 1741.25 Though the Opera house was not expected to be 
completed until October 1743, Fredrick the Great demanded an opening performance ten full 
months before the Opera House was completed.26 The hall was nowhere near completion: 
 …surrounded entirely by scaffolding, [the theater’s] portico and double 
staircase still in primitive stages of construction, the house could offer its 
audience by way of comfort only rough benches in place of the upholstery 
and plush the king had commanded. A huge tent hung from the roof in a drab 
attempt to conceal the ceiling’s unfinished condition.27  
 
Despite this, the theater unofficially premiered with a performance of Carl Heinrich 
Graun’s Cleopatra e Cesare on December 7, 1742.28  While this event marked the first official 
performance of the Staatsoper Unter den Linden, and the “beginning of a 250 year successful 
cooperation between the Staatsoper and Staatskapelle, the official opening was delayed until 
October 10, 1743.29 
 
																																																						
24 The Medieval Trading Center, Berlin.de. 
25 Oron, Staatskapelle Berlin. and  “History of Staatsoper,” Staatsoper Berlin, www.staatsoper-
berlin.de. 
26 History of the Staatsoper,Staatsoper Berlin..		
27 Kenneth Asch, “From Prussia with Love,” History Today, October 1992, 42. 
28 History of the Staatsoper,Staatsoper Berlin.  
29 Asch, “From Prussia with Love.”; History of the Staatsoper,Staatsoper Berlin.; Though strictly 
for members of court and military officers. 
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Fredrick the Great’s patronage of the Staatsoper was not just a result of his appreciation 
for the arts. His interest in bolstering the Staatsoper and its Opera House is deeply rooted in the 
dualistic rivalry between Austria and Prussia. Though Prussia began as a modest kingdom, 
Fredrick the Great aimed to expand and transform it into one of Europe’s great powers. Austria, 
a German speaking state that was wealthier and established part of the Holy Roman Empire, 
naturally presented competition. Politically, this manifested itself through the War of Austrian 
Succession as Fredrick seized Silesia, a wealthy Austrian province. But the rivalry also extended 
into the cultural sphere. As the center of the Habsburg monarchy, Austria was already full of 
palaces and Baroque churches—in short, a city of culture. Fredrick aimed to compete with 
Austria and therefore, utilized the arts as a vehicle for national cultural competition.30   
Prussia established a national Singspiel decades before Vienna and Vienna boasted its 
connection to Italian Opera.31 Fredrick the Great could boast “the intimate musical atmosphere 
which existed, where [he] actively directed proceedings, composed and had music written 
especially for him to perform, was wholly lacking in Vienna.” 32 But Fredrick’s support of the 
operas and other arts was not simply for the sake of Vienna. With the exception of Austria and 
Prussia, no other princes of the Holy Roman Empire had the military strength to give them 
influence in European Affairs.33 These kingdoms instead continued the “German” tradition of 
cultural competition. Each fought for the reputation of the best cultural and academic institutions 
as a means of asserting influence. The rulers of each kingdom fought, almost pettily, to collect 
																																																						
30 Jackson V. Spielvogel, Western Civilization: A Brief History, Volume II: Since 1500 (Boston: 
Wadsworth Publishing, 2014), 402.   
31 Elizabeth Maning, “The national singspiel in Vienna from 1778 to 1785” (PhD diss., Durham 
University, 1975), Durham E-Theses Online.   
32 Ibid. 
33 T. C. W. Blanning, The Triumph of Music: The Rise of Composers, Musicians and Their Art 
(Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008), 80-81.	
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the best artists, “Karl Theodore had the Stamitzes, the Cannabichs, Richter and Holzbauer on his 
payroll but missed the opportunity to add Mozart. Fredrick the Great more than doubled Johann 
Joachim Quantz’s salary when he lured him to Prussia from the employment of the elector of 
Saxony in 1740.”34 
This competitive drive and demand for performers of the highest caliber continued to 
shape the Staatsoper even after Fredrick’s death. In 1789, three years after Frederick’s death, the 
opera Unter den Linden was opened to the public. Despite this change and the fire and war that 
would force the repeated rebuilding of the Opera House, the opera continued its legacy of 
excellence and prestige. Its first public concert was a concert in memory of Wolfgang Amadeus 
Mozart for the benefit for his wife Constance. In the nineteenth-century, renowned musicians 
such as Felix Mendelssohn-Bartholdy and Richard Strauss influenced the group as its music 
director. Richard Wagner conducted the premieres of The Flying Dutchman in 1844 and Tristan 
in 1876 with the opera Unter den Linden.35  
Though the fall of the German Empire after World War I changed the name of the 
previously Royal Opera House to the Staatsoper (State Opera), the Staatsoper maintained its 
tradition. The prestigious and traditional legacy of the Staatsoper embedded itself in its identity, 
both in its stately residence in the Opera House Unter den Linden, rebuilt by renowned architect 
Karl Friedrich Schinkel in 1821 and its practices. 36  The status afforded to the ensemble by its 
long-standing excellence allowed it to transition into the role of leader in modern music. 
Conductors such as Wilhelm Furtwängler, Erich Kleiber, Otto Klemperer, Alexander von 
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Zemlinsky, and Bruno Walter secured the Staatsoper’s reputation as innovative and ground 
breaking during the 1920s.37 
In comparison to the Staatsoper, the Deutsche Oper has a much shorter history. The 
founding of the privately funded Deutsche Oper (originally the Deutsches Oper in 1912 was 
viewed by some as a “revolutionary act.” The Opera was created in Charlottenburg, far away 
from the Staatsoper Unter den Linden, it was intended to serve as a “democratic” alternative to 
the Staatsoper. Not only was the Deutsche Oper larger than any other opera house in Berlin, but 
had no loges; promoting democracy by ensuring that all visitors had a view of the stage. The 
Deutsche Oper also varied in performance choices. Since its inception, the Deutsche Oper 
believed itself the promoter of modern musical theater, performing lesser known works, 
scandalous novelties, and contemporary music all the while engaging only the world’s top-class 
conductors and singers. While the opera performed some niche pieces- unknown late 19th 
century oeuvres, Ernst Jrenek’s Jonny Spiel Auf, and Kurt Weill’s one Act plays Der Protagonist 
and Der Zar Laesst Sich Photographieren—it was still forced to compete against the Staatsoper 
Berlin’s recent foray into modern music and the creation of a third opera in 1927—the Kroll 
Opera.38  
The Kroll Opera was opened in 1924 and was the project of Leo Kestenberg, music 
assistant to the Prussian Ministry of Culture.39 The Kroll Opera functioned as the second house 
																																																						
37 Ibid. 
38 “History of the Opera House at Charlottenburg,” Deutsche Oper Berlin, 
www.deutscheoperberlin.de.; “Modern” is used here to describe the Neue Sachlichkeit (New 
Objectivity) movement that was prominent in Weimar Germany’s culture. This period rejected 
the sentimentality of late Romanticism that was characterized by composers such as Richard 
Strauss. During the Thrid-Reich, this “modernity” was censored and a more Romantic-style of 
music was given nationalistic purpose. 	
39 Erik Levi, Music in the Third Reich (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1994), 7. 
18	
of the Staatsoper. While the Staatsoper experimented with modern music, the Kroll Opera 
epitomized it. The Kroll was viewed as radical, so much so that it was one of the first cultural 
institutions attacked by the Nazi regime.40 The Kroll not only created a repertoire of 
contemporary operas, but also mounted modernist revisions of traditional works.41 The 
Staatsoper promoted a “modern” appearance during the 1920’s, while the Kroll Opera was the 
outlet for true modernism. In this way, the Deutsche Oper struggled to compete against an 
established “favorite.”   
Financial difficulty in 1925 was the driving force between the state ownership of the 
Deutsche Oper. Though the opera house had been popular with the public, the original stock 
corporation, Grosser Berliner Opernverein (Grand Berlin Opera Society) could not manage 
higher lease payment in the economic downturn. Grosser Berliner Opernverein withdrew and 
the city of Berlin assumed ownership.  Once the city of Berlin took control of the opera, it made 
several changes, most obviously in switching its name to the Städische Oper.42 The Städische 
Oper was established as a representative site for ambitious musical theater” with one of the 
students of Gustav Mahler, Bruno Walter as director. Some may argue that this diversification 
worked. The new Städische Oper gave a gala performance of Wagner’s Die Meistersinger von 
Nürmberg, arguably one of the most influential works of this period.43  Though state 
involvement was intended to diversify and ensure the profitability of the opera house (at this 
point it was one of three in Berlin), competition continued, especially with the Staatsoper’s focus 
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on “modernity.” The beginning of the 1930s marks a turning point for these ensembles. Despite 
very different beginnings, the two main groups- the Staatsoper and Deutsche Oper- were both 
under state control. Since the inception of the Deutsche Oper, there had been some competition 
between the groups, though the prestige of the Staatsoper and the novelty of the Deutsche Oper 




 While the Third Reich represents the biggest effort to make music national, the attempt 
once again fell prey to competitive impulses. During the Third Reich, both ensembles were 
charged with promoting nationalism through German opera- something neither had truly 
specialized in before. New leadership in both groups disrupted the status quo and Nazi leaders 
competed for control over “pet” ensembles.   Censorship too forced both ensembles to perform 
different repertoire. In this way, despite the singular focus on creating and supporting a “national 
German identity” through Nazi propaganda and practices, the competition between the groups 
remained dominant. Writers and historians asked “What is German” and others tried to answer 
the question through assertions of a music or culture. Wagner proposed the concept of a 
Germany defined by its art. As his opera, Die Meistersinger von Nürnberg, demonstrates, he 
imagined Germany as a country in which society and institutions allow art to thrive.   However, 
these retrospective assertions of identity were cast aside by the Third Reich’s active cultivation 
of national culture and identity. 
 Like all propaganda and appropriated work, there are glaring inconsistencies between 
Wagner’s “historically imagined utopia of art” depicted in Die Meistersinger and the Nazi state, 
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where some art was repurposed as superficial propaganda and other was censored all together.44  
Before the Third Reich, Germany’s national identity and its association with music was crafted 
through primarily rhetorical means. Though Die Meistersinger von Nürnberg, an opera about a 
singing competition and the cultivation of a “heil’ge deutsche Kunst,” seemed to suit the Nazi 
agenda of advancing a National cultural identity perfectly.45  It was quickly adopted as the 
National German Opera and promoted as a representation of “Germanness.”  Yet, in its role as 
the official German Opera, the differences between Wagner’s ideal presented in the opera and 
the Third Reich reality exposed fissures in the policies of the Nazis as well as the illusion of a 
national opera. While Wagner promoted the advancement of the arts, the Nazis, through 
censorship and propaganda stifled the arts’ ability to remain “deutsch und wahr” as his opera 
proposed.46  
 Still, no other German opera shares the close connection with the Third Reich as 
Wagner’s Die Meistersinger. There is no doubt that Wagner’s promotion of a “holy German Art” 
appealed to the nationalist urges of the National Socialist regime. As the party rose to power, the 
Meistersinger was quickly appropriated as a national opera. In 1933 alone, the opera was 
performed by the Staatsoper Berlin on the “Day of Potsdam”— the official inauguration of the 
new regime.47 A few months later, it was the premiere piece of the Deutsche Oper’s reopening 
complete with a banner displaying the words, “Was deutsch und echt”—complete with a 
swastika.”48 At the Bayreuth festival in the same year, Joseph Goebbels, Reichs Minister of 
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Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda, formalized Die Meistersinger’s role as the official opera 
of the Nazi Regime via radiobroadcast stating, “of all [Wagner’s] musical dramas Die 
Meistersinger stands out as the most German. It is simply the incarnation of our national 
identity.” 49 Once Die Meistersinger was recognized as a national opera, it was almost 
immediately repurposed as propaganda. In 1934, Leni Riefenstahl used Die Meistersinger as the 
soundtrack to her famous documentary Triumph of the Will—a film chronicling the 1934 Nazi 
Party Congress in Nuremberg.50 Unsurprisingly, it was also performed as part of the 1935 
“Parteitag der Freiheit” Nuremberg party rallies. 51 
  Wagner’s work appealed to the National Socialist party for several reasons. Die 
Meistersinger’s depiction and focus on the lives of common workers, social and political 
turmoil, and greatness of German art resonated with party members. Wagner’s work was also 
“relatively new but no longer offensively modern.”52 Above all, Die Meistersinger was a 
thoroughly German work on which the National Socialists could rely on for an endorsement of 
German national pride and industry.  
 As Die Meistersinger demonstrates, the incorporation of arts into national  
identity is a powerful nation-building strategy. At the same time, it also demonstrates that while 
music itself was central to the concept of Germanness, its association with identity was also 
completely constructed.  Die Meistersinger represents a standard of music that the National 
Socialists promoted as “German.”  Music was to feature, “resurgent nationalism, a 
conservative/traditional choice of subject matter and a preoccupation with völkish themes.53 
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Beyond these requirements, there was little consensus what truly “German” music consisted of. 
The “opera crisis” of the 1920s  continued into the Third Reich as a “commitment to an idea of 
inner authenticity—to the presentation of a ‘truth’” that had been a part of opera in the Weimar 
period was steadily eroded by censorship and other factors.54 
 The haphazard and inconsistent nature of a national music standard can also be seen 
through the the careers of several composers who, initially favored by the party, were 
condemned by music journals and lost their standing. Georg Vollerthun was, from 1933-34, 
ranked as the fourth top living composer.55 Still, even in 1933, music journals such as Zeitschrift 
für Musik and Die Musik criticized his work for being , “outdated and ideologically suspect.” 
One writer, Hans Kölzsch even denounced him for his, “cold ideology and snobbery” and “his 
reliance on a ‘hypocritical, artificial and unhealthy tyranny of style.’”56  Vollerthun quickly fell 
out of favor; his operas were only shown for at most a season and eventually not at all.57 In only 
a few months, the work of this minor composer that had been initially promoted by the party as 
ideal was kept out of production for ideological proposes. Both Graener and Vollerthun, as minor 
composers, were motivated by success and thus unlikely to have written works that were 
intentionally seditious. This example then only serves to highlight the fluidity of the ideal 
national music that the Third Reich struggled to shape. 
 While both the Staatsoper and Deutsche Oper were adversely affected by the social and 
political context of the Third Reich, these ensembles faced a much different experience than 
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many of their counterparts. Despite the ever-changing standards for which music represented the 
spirit of German nationalism, the Nazis implemented a strict policy of censorship. The 
censorship of operatic repertoire took place in two phases. As simple public protest against 
certain qualities of music transitioned into law in early 1933, the SA primarily responsible for 
enforcing the standards of the party. Initially, these agitators simply disrupted and forcibly 
prevented the performance of works, “considered to be tarnished by association with the Weimar 
Republic.” 58 In addition to the physical presence of these “enforcers,” threats in the papers, as 
well as official party declarations contributed to this first phase of active censorship. 59  Not only 
did this first phase necessitate the suppression of controversial works, but also the removal and 
replacement of all theater administrators, directors, and conductors identified as “unacceptable to 
the regime.”60  
 Reichsdramaturg Rainer Schlösser was responsible for much of the second phase of 
censorship. Though Schlösser was accountable to both Joseph Goebbels and Hans Hinkel, 
Assistant president of the Reichskulturkammer (Reichs Chamber of Culture/RKK), he was 
responsible for both censoring plays and monitoring operatic repertoire. Much of the censorship 
was subjective, though works that were both German and original were often promoted. Because 
contemporary operatic repertoire that was popular in the Weimar republic was essentially 
outlawed, there was an increased demand for new acceptable music. Most classics did not violate 
the new moral standard, but, a return to older music, “could have easily backfired…suggesting 
that instead of the much-trumpeted notion of national regeneration, the Nazis had in reality 
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instigated a period of cultural stagnation.”61 A leading commentator echoed this concern after 
surveying the 1934-35 season. He reported that only eighteen of forty-six opera houses had 
performed repertoire by a living German composer and a majority of these pieces were 
composed by already well-established masters like Richard Strauss.62  His solution echoed the 
currently policy—each theater should devote at least ten percent of its attention to preparing 
German operas and at least two should be composed by living Germans. Thus, as these 
censorship policies show, the creation of a distinct German cultural identity was a key aspect of 
National Socialist policy.  
   The Deutsche Oper and Staatsoper were simultaneously central to and removed from this 
censorship and nation building movement. As the two main Opera Houses in the Reich’s capital, 
they served as a mark of prestige and a showcase of German nationalism. The status of these 
ensembles drew the attention of several party officials, specifically Joseph Goebbels and 
Hermann Göring. By April 1933, Goebbels had already spent months competing with Alfred 
Rosenberg, the party’s chief ideologue for control of cultural affairs.63  Once Goebbels was 
appointed as Reichs Minister of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda, he already began 
orienting himself to take control of a much wider range of cultural activities.64 The guidelines of 
his ministry, according to a law passed on March 13 were, “spreading of enlightenment and 
propaganda within the policy of the Reichs Government and the national reconstruction of the 
German Fatherland.”65 This broad statement of purpose paired with Goebbels’ ambition resulted 
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in the creation of seven departments in his Ministry, some with branches devoted to film and 
theater.66  Rival politicians, most notably Hermann Göring also aspired for control over the 
nation’s cultural institutions. Göring created the Preussischer Theaterausschuss (Prussian Theatre 
Commission) in February 1933 as an assertion of control. As the Prime Minister of Prussia, 
Göring had singular control over the artistic institutions of former Prussia. Thus, the Preussisches 
Staatstheater and most importantly the Staatsoper Berlin were under his juristdiction. This was a 
political move that struck at Goebbels’ cultural control. Goebbels had previously been appointed 
Gauleiter (District Leader) of Berlin and therefore exercised control over all the city’s 
organizations.67  
 Over the next several months, Goebbels faced challenges from countless other political 
opponents for cultural control of Germany.68 After no small amount of politicking, he secured 
the position as head of the Reichs Chamber of Culture which empowered him to supervise the 
entire country’s intellectual and cultural activities. 69  During this time period Goebbels, 
threatened by several other rivals drafted an agreement with Göring. Göring was to dissolve the 
Prussian Theater Commission in exchange for retaining sole authority over the Staatsoper 
Berlin.70 No other official, including Goebbels could interfere with Göring’s administrative 
decisions for the ensemble. During this time period, Goebbels also gained control of the 
Deutsche Oper (then the Städische Oper) as result of the death of the Intendant, Max von 
Schillings.71  
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 Though much of the disagreement between Goebbels and Göring was about institutional 
control, that Göring was willing to concede control over every other Prussian institution except 
the Staatsoper is crucial. While Goebbels certainly was focused on wide-spread institutional 
control, for Göring at least, the Staatsoper was exceptional. With Goebbels as the head of the 
Städische Oper, there was a “conflict of interests” in the administration of these two Berliner 
ensembles.72  
 In early 1933, both ensembles were criticized by the Nazi press as agents of “cultural 
bolshevism.” 73 One newspaper, the Völkischer Beobachter, criticized the published repertoire of 
both ensembles as “prostitute operas featuring Jews and Negros.” 74 If the controversial 
repertoire was provocative to party critics, the houses’ revisionist interpretations of beloved 
works was even more inflammatory. In February 1933, both opera houses performed 
reinterpreted versions of Wagner’s early operas in memory of the fiftieth anniversary of his 
death. The Deutsche Oper performed Der fliegende Holländer produced by Carl Ebert with 
“modernist sets” by Caspar Neher. The Staatsoper presented Tannhäuser directed by Jürgen 
Fehling and conducted by Otto Klemperer. Both performances demonstrated a staunch disregard 
for the values of the Third Reich and were both denounced.  
 The reaction to these performances resulted in a dispute between Goebbels and Göring 
that represents both the struggle between the two leaders and the difference with which they 
controlled their respective ensembles. The SA stormed the Deutsche Oper and forced the 
removal of Carl Ebert. Goebbels, resolved to exercise his control over the Deutsche Oper most 
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certainly sanctioned and likely instigated the SA’s forcible removal of Ebert.75 At the same time, 
vicious articles in the press demanded for the removal of Heinz Tietjen, the Intendant of the 
Staatsoper, insisting that he should instead, “be replaced by a person with nationalist 
sympathies.” 76  Though Tietjen was verbally attacked by the press, he maintained his position as 
Intendant of the Staatsoper. Undoubtedly, this is due to Göring’s personal defiance and perhaps 
his close relationship with Hitler. 77  Whether Göring’s reaction was in actual support of the 
Staatsoper or just a demonstration of his power, his appearance of support lasted throughout the 
Third Reich. In many ways, Göring was actually quite benevolent in his treatment of the 
Staatsoper, especially in the context of Nazi policies. Not only did the opera house manage to 
assert some agency in the promotion of new operas, but they also had a fair amount of leeway 
when performing operas. For example, the opera house was allowed to perform Zemlinsky’s 
Kreidekreis, a work banned for its composer’s Jewish heritage. 78 Similarly, despite the formalist 
influence of Stravinsky and Weill, the Staatsoper was allowed to present Egk’s Peer Gynt.  
 The Deutsche Oper was not so lucky. Goebbels’ close party ties and perhaps more rigid 
personal philosophy meant, “the company was less able to assume an individual identity in the 
manner of the Staatsoper.”79  Another factor that is central to the Deutsche Oper’s strict control 
was Goebbels’ völkish preoccupations. Goebbels’ hoped to mitigate the opera’s high bourgeois 
beginnings by making the opera house widely available to the public.80  Not only did he ensure 
that repertoire was appropriate by party standards but he also reduced ticket prices 
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significantly.81  Where the Staatsoper under Göring’s control was still able to assert some limited 
autonomy, the Deutsche Oper was co-opted as a vehicle for party propaganda. 
 Even under the umbrella of extreme Nationalism, these two ensembles were still vastly 
different entities in competition with each other. Before the Third Reich, the Staastsoper was 
defined by its Royal beginnings and the prestige of its many directors and conductors. 
Conversely, the Deutsche Oper was a middle class experiment- privately funded with a 
democratic focus. These two ensembles couldn’t have been more different. Though the sole 
purpose of German cultural institutions during the Third Reich was the construction and 
promotion of a unified national identity, the glaring differences that remained between these two 
groups signal that the competition between party leaders outweighed the fictional national 





  For both ensembles, the Cold War period represented an opportunity to “rediscover” 
their identities, especially under the competing pressures of the NATO alliance and Russia. 
Neither ensemble was in direct competition for resources and therefore theoretically free from 
the competition that had occurred in the Weimar Republic and under the patronage of rival Nazi 
officials. The Staatsoper simply fell under Soviet control while the Deutsche Oper was managed 
by the Allied powers.82  However, the relatively fluid interactions between the two Germanys 
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before the construction of the Berlin wall if anything aggravated the rivalry. The proximity of the 
two ensembles, the different ideologies of government influence, and the existing impulse for 
competition worsened relations between the two groups. 
 During the early postwar period, the now East-German Staatsoper recruited the best 
musicians in Berlin with promises of extra food rations and funding.83  The immediate effort to 
invigorate post-war culture in East-Berlin can also be seen through the establishment of the 
Komische Oper, a niche opera house founded in 1947. The Soviets recruited celebrated Austrian 
stage-director Walter Felsenstein to lead this effort.84  The acquisition of Felsenstein was only 
the first of many competitions between the two states for impressive musicians. In 1954, Erich 
Kleiber finally agreed, after years of negotiation, to take a position as the resident conductor of 
the Staastoper.85 Once Kleiber’s decision reached the public, several key singers from Hamburg, 
Vienna and the Deutsche Oper left their positions and joined Kleiber in East Germany’s 
Staatsoper.86  Though Klieber ultimately left his position only a few weeks after beginning, his 
initial  commitment aggravated the Deutsche Oper and continued the predictable struggle for the 
best musicians.87  
 The competition for musicians was not limited to soloists and directors. As stated above, 
musicians were lured to the East with promises of funding and food rations. Though after the 
currency reform of 1948, West Berlin’s Deutsche Oper became the more profitable option.88 The 
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porous nature of the early border, sometimes referred to as the “nylon curtain” rather than the 
Iron curtain lead to continued tensions between the two nations as artists could quite easily move 
between the two sectors.89 Walter Felsenstein, the director of the Komische Oper that the east 
worked tirelessly to recruit, chose to work in the East but live in the West- for many, the best of 
both worlds.90 Many other musicians found the East Berlin funding of ensembles far superior to 
that of the West and the living conditions of the West much more pleasant than the East. 
 A 1951 report by the Deutsche Staatsoper reported that 675 of its 1052 employees lived 
in West Berlin. Of the minority who did live in East Berlin, many of them worked as technical 
staff and not musicians or performers. 91  This was something the Staatsoper’s committee who, 
“raised frequent concerns about [the figures] ideological and economic implications” grew to 
resent.92 Though these musicians performed with the Staatsoper and only lived in West Berlin, 
the animosity of the committee illustrates the competition between the Staatsoper and Deutsche 
Oper, as well as East and West went beyond employment. Even in the 1950s, the competition 
between these groups became more nebulous and focused on the abstract concepts of identity 
and belonging. For the 1951 Staatsoper committee, being part of the Staatsoper did not simply 
mean being part of the ensemble, but being part of a group that was part of an East German 
society.   Some members of the committee even proposed to rid the company of its “Western 
Employees,” which was later rejected on grounds of necessity.93 
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  Throughout the 1950s the direct competition for musicians shifted to a rivalry based in 
recognition and prestige, for both the Staatsoper and Deutsche Oper and on a broader national 
scale. For the 200th anniversary of Bach’s death in 1950, the GDR and FRG cooperated to 
publish a new compete Bach edition. Two thirds of the original manuscripts needed to create the 
edition were in the West, while the other third was in the East. Though this was an effort driven 
only by necessity, it resulted in four years of close collaboration between East and West German 
musicologists. When the work was completed in 1954, a celebration was planned for its official 
presentation. However, paper shortages in the GDR meant the work would appear in East 
Germany much later, leaving the West Germans free to downplay and even ignore the 
collaborative aspect with the GDR. In the official presentation’s program in September 1954, not 
a single worked was mentioned or publicized about the GDR’s participation in the new edition.94 
This sort of passive-aggressive competition became a regular part of interactions between East 
and West music groups.  
In many ways, the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 ironically eased tensions 
between East and West musical communities though inciting political problems. The physical 
barrier between the two sectors forced personal reflection and identity formation. Both the 
Deutsche Oper and the Staatsoper were free to become the most prominent opera-houses in their 
respective sectors. Without the direct competition for resources, both ensembles were able to 
form distinct identities in Cold War Germany.   While ensembles in both the GDR and the FRG 
both performed familiar eighteenth and nineteenth century classics like Mozart and Verdi, their 
stances on contemporary music are what truly fostered separate identities. Ensembles in the FRG 
promoted the work of modernist West German composers like Boris Blacher, Aribert Reimann, 
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Werner Egk, and Hans Werner Henze.95 The GDR instead promoted the socialist realist 
compositions of East German composers like Paul Dessau, Kurt Schwaen, Jean Kurt Forest 
Guenter Kochan and even some Soviet composers like Shostakovich. 96 In this way, while 
Germans in both sectors maintained an identity tied to musical excellence, separation shaped 
these new identities based on conceptions of eastern and western “Germanness.” Yet, to assume 
that the wall ended all competition between these groups is incorrect. Much like ignored incident 
surrounding the Bach edition, separate identities were not enough to ease tensions between the 
ensembles. They instead fell back on the competition that was in place since the inception of the 




















Though both the Staatsoper and Deutsche Oper had formed their own identities and created their 
own performance niches during the post-war period, reunification in 1990 forced these operas 
back into a competition for resources. Keeping with the spirit of reunification, reforms were 
proposed in the late 1990’s to reduce the state funding of 250 million DM spent per year on 
opera. The financial demands of reunification as well as perceived excess in the support for the 
arts—no other city in the world supported three opera houses—forced discussion of 
consolidation. As a result, on October 12, 2000, cultural senator Christoph Stölzl proposed a 
merger, combining the operas into a cost effective “Opera Stages of Berlin”— a plan that was 
met with a huge backlash and was officially rejected a year later.  
Members of each opera were incensed— a merger would both eliminate positions and 
change the established identities of each group. However, the general public reacted nearly as 
strongly. Highly publicized reactions from both ensembles’ directors played to public concerns 
with German identity. Newspapers all over the country reported on Berlin’s “Opera Wars.” The 
Frankfurter Allgemeine had a featured piece on the ensembles, Barenboim, or Stölzl nearly every 
day between October and December 2000. On an administrative level, the merging of the two 
main opera houses- the Deutsche Oper and Staatsoper, as well as the Komische Oper eliminated 
two music director positions. This would have left only one position for the music director of the 
merged operas- in turn making this role both very prestigious and very competitive.97 Initially, 
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the public speculated whether Barenboim (music director of the Staatsoper) or Christian 
Thielemann (director of the Deutsche Oper) would be given this position.  
 The dispute was so fraught that it attracted international attention.  Not only did the New 
York Times feature several articles on the Opera Wars, but the Chicago Sun-Times, the Wall 
Street Journal, the New Yorker, Herald Journal. Tuscaloosa News, Sun Journal, and countless 
other news sources also covered it. This may be due in part to Barenboim’s international 
prominence. Born in Argentina and raised in Israel, he not only traveled extensively but was the 
former conductor for the Opera-Bastille in Paris and was the music director of the Chicago 
Symphony until 2004.98 Barenboim’s public role in the protest certainly attracted international 
attention. But, contemporary issues of reunification, German identity, and anti-Semitism also 
were projected onto the crisis, making the Berlin “Opera Wars” a source of international 
fascination.  
A leading Berlin politician from the Christian Democratic party, Klaus Landowsky, 
summarized the situation to the Berliner Morgenpost in a way that would not soon be forgotten, 
“On the one hand you have the young von Karajan in Theilemann, on the other you have the Jew 
Barenboim.” 99Although Landowsky would insist he simply meant to praise Berlin’s cultural 
diversity, the public was immediately frenzied. Not only had Landowsky made a seemingly 
insensitive and seemingly anti-Semitic comment, but also pitted  Barenboim’s Jewishness 
against a gentile,  Herbert von Karajan, who as longtime conductor of the Berlin Philharmonic 
never disavowed his decision to join the Nazi party.100 It sounded as if Nazi prejudice had not 
died.  Though the mayor of Berlin and fellow Christian Democratic member Eberhard Diepgen 
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immediately called to reassure Barenboim “that Mr. Landowsky’s statement was in fact meant as 
a compliment underscoring the cultural diversity of the “new Berlin,” much of the public 
remained unconvinced and incensed.101 Barenboim responded to the mayor by explaining, 
“however you read the remark, it is offensive…I find this sort of anti-Semitism so incredible, I 
don’t want to believe it.” 102 He later released a public statement conveying his astonishment to 
discover that, “my Jewishness could have anything to do with my position at the Staatsoper or 
with my music.”103  Barenboim also used this platform to announce that if the merger between 
the two operas was approved, he would leave his position at the Staatsoper.  
Though the incendiary comment was made by a politician, not a musician, anti-Semitism 
became the uglier side of the rivalry between the Staatsoper and Deutsche Oper. Each ensemble 
competed for superiority, while their music conductors also competed. The promise of a single 
music director position for the merged ensembles also seemed to increase the tension between 
the Deutsche Oper and Staatsoper, and consequently Theilemann and Barenboim. Though 
initially both conductors had announced that they would leave their positions if the merger was 
pursued, Thielemann later, “made clear that he would be available to head a merged Berlin 
Opera.”104 Certainly, this furthered the feud between the ensembles as Barenboim’s advocacy for 
the Staatsoper and idealist vision was pitted against Thielemann’s opportunism.  Ulrich Roloff-
Momin, Berlin cultural official, published in the Frankfurter Allgemeine, a plea for Barenboim to 
stay, “Is it not really unbearable that even responsible politicians always emphasize the Jew 
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Barenboim rather than the artist of world acclaim?” 105 He then condemned a remark attributed 
to Thielemann upon hearing of Barenboim’s intent to resign, “Now the Jewish mess in Berlin is 
coming to an end.”106 Thielemann later denied this statement and musicians from both opera 
houses made a statement that they had never heard such a remark. Still, that claims of anti-
Semitism were forced—either by Thielemann or the media— to play a role in the enduring 
competition between both ensembles speaks to both the longevity and intensity of the rivalry. By 
juxtaposing what he saw as a German and an “Other” or outsider, Landowsky implied a sort of 
cultural ownership over the ability to lead a German ensemble and shape a cultural identity. 
Barenboim, as an Israeli-Argentinian, was in some senses an outsider to German culture. In fact, 
Barenboim’s Jewishness made his musical roots German. His experience with the Israeli 
Philharmonic in the 1950s introduced him to a style of playing that was inherently German as 
most of the Jewish players in the early 1950s were refugees from Germany.107 Thus, 
Barenboim’s link to German culture is through his Jewishness, contrary to Landowsky’s 
dichotomy. This poses a challenge to a German national identity through music.  For, if music 
knows no national boundaries, then music cannot truly be the basis of an exclusive national 
identity. 
While the rivalry between Barenboim and Thielemann was perhaps encouraged by the 
press, the feud between Barenboim and Stölzl needed no provocation. Stölzl argued very simply 
that his plan made sense and would provide Berlin with a system similar to that in Paris— a 
national Opera with two houses. He claimed it would, “save money, while allowing the Deutsche 
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Oper to concentrate on a Romantic repertory and the Staatsoper on classical performances.”108 
Berlin, even ten years after reunification was still reeling suffering from having to support the 
much weaker east German currency. It was already well on its way to being one of the most 
financially strapped German cities.109  
  That this plan could save,  “a hundred and twelve million dollars a year or eight million 
dollars more than the entire annual budget of the National Endowment of the arts” while also, 
“dispos[ing] of its incipient opera wars” was convincing for many politicians.110 However, 
politically Stölzl made a misstep by choosing not to consult any of the best known German 
Opera intendants, something that further provoked deep-seated regional competition.  
 In Germany, intendants are highly regarded. As the general director for the all aspects of 
the opera house they, “become powerful cultural personages, not only the public face of an opera 
house but in a very real way its identity, and people associate them with a particular style and 
character, and even a particular take on Germanness.” 111 No intendant in Berlin had a reputation 
to match any of the twelve that were meeting in Zurich the day Stölzl announced his strategy. 
These intendants including Klaus Zehelein, intendant of the Staatsoper Stuttgart, were angry to 
have not been consulted. Zehelein claims that the other intendants knew all about Berlin’s opera 
crisis: 
They knew that Berlin had lost the core of its old opera public (…liberal, 
educated bourgeoisie) when it lost its Jews and Social Democrats and 
intellectuals to Hitler, and that contemporary Berlin, especially East Berlin 
was largely a worker’s city and didn’t have anywhere near the audience that 
big cities of the west could count on….They knew Berlin’s own houses 
weren’t doing very much to replenish the audience they had... The 
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intendants knew that there wasn't much energy in some of Berlin's 
productions; some were conventional, and others were simply bad. They 
knew that money got wasted, and that, in every season with three "Figaro"s 
to compare, there were going to be too many days with no opera in Berlin at 
all. They knew that Barenboim was stubborn when it came to his own limits, 
that his company needed a real intendant--someone who was more of an 
artistic director and less of a bureaucrat than the one he had. And they knew 
that Thielemann and his intendant, Udo Zimmermann--who was still 
officially at his last job, with the Oper Leipzig, and wouldn't take over the 
Deutsche Oper for another ten months--already disliked each other so 
intensely that Thielemann had even announced his resignation (he changed 
his mind when another conductor accepted the job and the orchestra lobbied 
to get him back), and that now, as one musician put it, the two men 
"communicated by sabotage."112 
 
This assessment of Berlin’s opera scene by other German opera managers provides 
intriguing insight into where Berlin’s operas fit on a national scale. While Zehelein’s analysis of 
Berlin’s opera scene may be completely accurate, his critique once again exposes the myth of a 
German national identity through music. The merger of the two main Berlin Operas for many 
would act as the creation of a national German Opera. Yet, the way that Zehelein describes the 
Opera crisis in Berlin is both critical and removed. Quite simply, Zehelein was the acting 
intendant of the Staatsoper Stuttgart, and as in the days of Fredrick the Great, regional 
competition for prestige was endemic to the music world. Though the Staatsoper Berlin and the 
Deutsche Oper Berlin were both focused on the rivalry with each other, other regional ensembles 
watched Berlin cautiously. Perhaps Stölzl chose not to ask the other intendants because he 
recognized this competition.  
Despite Stölzl’s best intentions, Barenboim was incensed. He summarized Stölzl’s plan as 
the, “ruin of two houses to save $5 million out of a cultural budget of several hundred million 
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dollars,” something he clearly believed “makes no artistic or financial sense.”113 Though 
Barenboim had no ties to East or West Germany in any way linked to national identity (except 
his connect to German music through his Jewish roots ), his representation of the Staatsoper’s 
unique culture signals that the rivalry encompasses far more history than just the few years of 
forced separation between East and West Berlin. The Staatsoper, Baremboim insisted, “is 250 
years old, its Staatskapelle orchestra is the second oldest in the world, while the Deutsche Oper is 
a 20th-century creation. But instead of deciding priorities and saying one opera house, the 
Staatsoper, represents Germany and Berlin and must be supported, we have a muddled attempt to 
cement the now unaffordable cultural proliferation of the years of the Berlin Wall.” 114 
Barenboim’s very public protest drew the attention of many notable public figures, 
including business magnate Peter Dussmann. Dussmann, a longtime supporter of the Staatsoper 
pledged to donate $450,000 to the Staatsoper annually for at least three years and promised to 
raise more funds through corporate sponsors.115 Barenboim’s wealthy patron also funded an open 
letter protesting the merger, much like an earlier discussed below was written and signed by 
members of the Staatsoper. Like the first, it emphasized the importance of the Staatsoper’s 
history— both their personal connection to repertoire and many “bedeutene Namen.”  Unlike the 
first, it did not address any of the technical aspects of the merger. Instead, much of the letter 
explained how, “Die geplante Zusammenglegung von Staatsoper und Deutscher Oper würde im 
Fall der Staatsoper eine über 250jährige Theatertradition, im Fall der Deutschen Oper eine knapp 
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100kährige Tradition zunichte machen.”116 Though much of the media coverage and discussion 
surrounding the merger seemed to treat the incident in relation to East and West Berlin, it is 
telling that the Staatsoper viewed their “künstlerische Substanz und Identität” as extending back 
far beyond the Cold War era separation.  While the Berlin Wall had certainly aggravated an 
existing competition and tied each ensemble’s success with ideological superiority of 
competition political systems, the ensembles themselves realized that both their culture and 
rivalry were much deeply rooted.  
 In a 2003 interview, Thielemann skillfully articulated the divide between the contextual 
perception of the ensembles’ competition and its reality: 
   
  It’s true there isn’t a good atmosphere because everyone is fighting for 
subsidies. Competition is not good for cooperation…We’re both playing in 
the same league, The Staatsoper is older. We have a larger house and bigger 
repertory. We compete every evening, but when people say one is better 
than the other, there is always an East- West rivalry” 117 
 
While the media seemed to promote or at least reflect the public’s East and West rivalry in the 
context of the opera wars, the musicians of each ensemble focused far more on the institutional 
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Only a few days after Stölzl’s announcement, several prominent members of the 
Staatsoper Berlin sent out an open letter. This letter read:	
 
Berlin’s Minister of Culture, Prof. Dr. Christoph Stölzl, submitted a catalogue of  
measures for a reform of the structure of performing arts venues on October 12, 2000; 
with which, the existence of the current opera houses, theatres and orchestras in Berlin 
should be secured. 
 
In the catalogue he suggests merging the two largest opera houses of the city, the 
Staatsoper and the Deutsche Oper, into one theatre, therefore drastically reducing the size 
of the combined orchestras, choirs and ballet ensembles. In total the orchestras will lose 
77 jobs—40 in the choir the choirs and 16 in the ballet. 
 
In the future, the members of the individual ensembles will be made available to every 
other ensemble when their own size is not enough to perform works of larger dimensions. 
This will result in orchestras, but also choirs and ballet ensembles, losing their artistic 
identity and distinctiveness in sound, style, tradition and training, and create a mere 
anonymous pool of artists. 
 
Furthermore, the proposal suggests, that the State Opera would only be allowed to work 
with a repertoire ranging from baroque opera to the early 19th century works. The works 
of Wagner, Verdi, or Richard Strauss are to be taken off the program of the Lindenoper 
(Staatsoper) entirely. The opera house where Richard Strauss worked as general music 
director for twenty years—where he often conducted his own operas such as Salome, 
Ariadne auf Naxos and Der Rosenkavalier— and in which Alban Berg's Wozzeck 
premièred, is considered to be unsuitable for the works of Strauss and Berg, which are 
only going to be performed in the Deutsche Oper from here on out. 
 
If you consider this development to be dangerous and wrong, as we do, please ask the 
artists of the State Opera to protest against this decision. Enclosed you can find a draft of 
such a letter of protest. 
 
Your protest can help to preserve the State Opera. Please send a corresponding letter to 
the President of the state parliament of Berlin, Mr. Reinhard Führer, 10111 Berlin 
(Prussian Landtag building). We rely on your support!118 
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Though brief, this letter highlights both the immediate grievances of the Staatsoper, and 
aspects of its history that were central to its identity. While the controlling members of the 
Staatsoper certainly objected to the loss of “seventy-seven orchestra positions, forty Choir 
positions, and sixteen Ballet positions,”119 much of the letter focuses on repertoire. The merger 
would force the Staatsoper to only perform works from the Baroque era through the early 19th 
century, saving the larger Romantic pieces for the Deutsche Oper. While this distinction was 
formed in accordance with the sizes of the respective theaters- the Opera House Unter den 
Linden was simply much smaller than the Deutsche Oper and could not easily accommodate the 
larger performances typical of the Romantic composers-the letter depicts this specialization as an 
assault on artistic freedom and an insult to the ensemble’s heritage.  
																																																						
einem Theater zu fusionieren und hierbei die Kollektivkörper der Orchester, Chöre und 
Ballettensemble drastisch zu reduzieren. So sollen die Orchester 77 Stellen, die Chöre 40 
Stellen und das Ballett 16 Stellen verlieren. 	
Die Mitglieder der einzelnen Ensembles sollen zukünftig zu Aufführungsdiensten in den 
anderen Ensembles heerangezogen werden, wenn deren Besetzungsstärke zu Aufführung 
grösser dimensionierter Werke nicht mehr ausreicht. Dies hätte zu Folge, dass die Orchester, 
aber auch die Chöre und unser Ballettensemble ihre künstlerische Identität und 
Unverwechselbarkeit in Klang und Stil, in Tradition und Schulung verlieren und in einem 
anonymen Künstlerpool aufgehen würden. Darüber ist in dem Papier vorgesehen, dass an der 
Staatsoper zukünftig nur noch ein Repertoire von der Barockoper bis ins frühe 19. 
Jahrhundert aufgeführt werden darf. Die Werke Wagners, Verdis oder eines Richard Strauss 
sollen aus dem Spielplan der Lindenoper verschwinden. Das Haus, an dem Richard Strauss 
für 20 Jahre lang als Generalmusikdirektor wirkte und oft eigene. Werke wie SALOME, 
ARIADNE AUS NAYOS UND DER ROSENKAVALIER selbst dirigierte und an den der 
WOZZECK von Alban Berg uraufgeführt wurde wird als ungeeignet für die Werke von 
Strauss und Berg erklärt, die zukünftig nur noch in der Deutschen Oper gegeben werden 
sollen. Wenn Sie diese Entwicklung wie wir, für gefährlich und falsch halten, so bitten Sie 
die Künstler der Staatsoper, gegen eine solche Entscheidung zu protestieren. Einen Entwurf 
für derartiges Protestschreiben finden Sie beiliegend. Ihr Protest kann zum Erhalt der 
Staatsoper beitragen. Bitte senden Sie ein entsprechendes Schreiben an den Präsidenten des 
Abgeordnetenhauses von Berlin, Herrn Reinhard Führer, 10111 Berlin (Preuss, Landtag). 
Wir sind angewiesen auf Ihre Unterstützung! 
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The Staatsoper’s personal connection to Mozart, Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, Strauss, 
Wagner, and other celebrated figures was as important to its identity as its courtly background. 
Where the Deutsche Oper’s novelty had given it the opportunity to experiment with both its 
performance space and its repertoire in the early twentieth century, the Staatsoper’s prestigious 
background compelled the creation of the Kroll Opera for truly experimental pieces in order to 
maintain its reputation. Even in the Third Reich, the Staatsoper had relatively greater artistic 
freedom than the Deutsche Oper in part to maintain its distinction.  For the merger to restrict the 
Staatsoper from performing Romantic works was viewed by its members as a personal attack on 
the ensembles’ identity. Moreover, assigning this particular repertoire to the Deutsche Oper only 
heightened the rivalry between the two ensembles. Members of the Staatsoper were afraid not 
only to “lose their artistic identity and distinctiveness in sound and style, in tradition and 
training”120 but also their perceived superiority over the Deutsche Oper.  
As seen above, the division between the two groups was steeped in a competition which 
established long before the imposition of the division of East and West Berlin. While the 
ensembles themselves understood that their traditions and histories shaped their unique and 
opposing identities, the general public seemed to attribute their differences to the East-West 
conflicts to be overcome by reunification. Initially, many individuals, especially performers, give 
diplomatic answers regarding competition between ensembles and reunification. One member of 
the Deutsche Oper explained the conflict surrounding the merger by stating: 
Before reunification, the Deutsche Oper was the only show in town. It made lots of 
money and even had around two or three separate performances a week. Suddenly, 
the wall fell and no one expected it. Berlin was left with three operas and none of 
them could really be closed down. They couldn’t close the Komishe Oper as it was 




also somewhat of a “helige Kuh”. And they couldn’t close the Deutsche Oper 
because it was successful 121 
 
This balanced observation recognizes the success of each ensemble, while also 
acknowledging how reunification forced the groups to re-compete for resources, something that 
had not been an issue during separation of East and West. A theater teacher in West Berlin and 
frequent opera-goer gave a similar answer, focusing primarily on the technical aspects of 
reunification rather than differences in identity, “The biggest conflict between East and West was 
for that [single] generation. There was double of everything- orchestras, theaters, etc.  and in 
East Germany there was far more than in the West....for this reason, maybe this generation 
blamed reunification.”122 A musician with the DSO (Deutsches Symphonie Orchester Berlin) 
related the conflict between the Deutsche Oper and Staatsoper to his own ensemble, “Its [name] 
changed because it was too similar to an east German ensemble and was confusing. Both groups 
played similar music and had similar names. The Japanese once asked why the same orchestra 
toured twice a year.”123 This man argued that despite all the assertions of a divided East and 
West identity, many ensembles in each sector were the same, even to a confusing degree.  
 Yet, despite the delicacy with which they addressed the topic, when asked to elaborate, 
each of these individuals spoke in depth about the distinctive identities of East and West Berlin 
and their respective ensembles. After only a few moments, it was obvious which “Germany” 
each identified with. Though some of the interviewees, like the theater teacher, described the 
difference between East and West performers in broad terms, “…it was very obvious to tell who 
was from east and who was from west through the way they spoke, how often they spoke, things 
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like that…,” the others articulated the differences in primarily two ways: through sound and 
leadership style. 124 
 Both Matthias Glander, one of the Staatsoper members who took on a leadership role 
in the protest against the merger and a member of the DSO, a former West German Ensemble 
commented on a unique “German Sound.” This sound was, “darker” with “longer vibrato,” a 
sound that contrasted sharply against the Western, “efficient technique and brilliant sound.”125 
The DSO musician explained the distinction, “In the West, musicians were influenced by 
Russian-Jewish musicians who traveled to America and established this school of efficient 
technique and brilliant sound.”126 While this musician’s observation is supported by academic 
literature— the German School of Music was distinct from the Russian School and the Russian 
school did highly influence American musicians in the early twenty-first century— he was quick 
to add his personal assessment, “I don’t know why [East Germans] didn’t go to Moscow to study 
as there were many good Russian teachers there.”127 This simple statement reveals that this 
musician identified with and supported this Western style of playing while discriminating against 
the East German style of playing. Matthias Glander also describes the distinction between East 
and West German sound. However, Glander describes how Barenboim intentionally embraced 
this “tradition” and underscored its centrality to the Staatsoper’s identity: 
 Our former conductor was very sick and could not continue …We asked Barenboim 
to come and do a rehearsal. Afterwards he said, “wow, what a wonderful sound. I 
remember this sound from the Israeli philharmonic of the 1950’s” (all the Jewish 
players were refugees from Germany).  It was great for him to have this old German 
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cultural sound because orchestras in the west were much more mixed- American 
style, French style, British style. But this old German style was a very special sound- 
a lot of vibrato, etc. It’s a unique thing. And he was very happy about it and he 
wanted to develop this sound/style…on the one hand to hold this tradition and on the 
other hand make us a modern orchestra able to play French music and Russian music 
(in a Russian style). But this German sound, this good German sound is something 
that was really special.128 
 
Like the DSO musician, Glander recognizes the difference between the “old German cultural 
sound” and the more modern West German sound. In part, this distinction can be linked to 
migration, the Deutsche Oper, as a part of West Germany had many more foreign musicians who 
joined the ensemble. In contrast, the East German Staatsoper, primarily consisted of East 
German musicians. However, Glander describes how, in 1992, Barenboim became the 
Staatsoper’s music director and chose to maintain this sound and therefore promote the 
Staatsoper’s identity with its Prussian roots. Thus, while the Deutsche Oper and Staatsoper 
certainly had different identities, in which their unique sounds were essential, these identities 
were cultivated and reinforced even during reunification.  
 The leadership style and personality of each ensemble’s music director also shaped their 
identities. While, as the various letters of protest show, the influence of Strauss, and other 
notable figures certainly shaped the Staatsoper’s reputation and character, Barenboim’s 
leadership has had the most recent impact. Critics describe Barenboim as a force to be reckoned 
with: 
Barenboim is peripatetic--his critics say overextended--and stubbornly at home 
anywhere that music is played, from Berlin to Chicago, and indeed from Bayreuth, 
where he put in eighteen seasons, to Jerusalem, where he took on his own 
government this summer by conducting selections from "Tristan und Isolde," after 
agreeing to its demand that he drop Wagner from his program…He made an end 
run around the problem by conducting an approved program and, once it was over, 
having a long and "very personal" debate with the audience and then playing 
Wagner; "brazen, arrogant, uncivilized, and insensitive," the mayor of Jerusalem 
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said. A music critic in Berlin once described the "Barenboim sound" …not entirely 
approvingly… as "a belief that, with music, everything is better in the world 129 
 
This distinct personality undoubtable shaped the personality of the  Staatsoper. According to 
Glander, the Staatsoper specifically recruited Barenboim after he left his appointment in Paris. 
Whether Barenboim’s reputation or strong ideals influenced the Staatsoper’s leaders to seek out 
Barenboim, many would argue that his leadership style suited the ensemble well. A member of 
the Deutsche Oper characterized Barenboim as, “ like the king, like an emperor or dictator.” 130 
The DSO musician echoed this sentiment, “Barenboim too is an example of this East German 
authoritarianism. Some people call him “the lion” because it is either his way or no way.”131 The 
West German association between Barenboim and “East German authoritarianism” speaks to the 
projected influence of divided Berlin on the Operas’ existing competition. Barenboim’s style 
may be more involved than Thielemann’s, but as Barenboim is not from East Germany and took 
control of the ensemble after reunification, the association with East Berlin is merely a construct 
intended to distinguish the East German backwardness of the Staatsoper from the West German 
modernity of the Deutsche Oper.  
 Yet, this is all cultivated; not a reflection of reality. Frankly, Thielemann’s dedication to 
“Germanness” seems better suited to the Staatsoper’s image than the Deutsche Oper’s: 
Thielemann is, by his own account, proudly provincial; he would rather be in Berlin 
than in any other city. A critic in Stuttgart described the Thielemann sound to me as 
"a hundred and twenty musicians playing German music written between 1860 and 
1920. Whatever he plays, it all sounds like that." It's hard to imagine Thielemann 
tackling a piece by a cerebral contemporary foreign composer like Pierre Boulez (as 
Barenboim has often done in concerts)."I don't trust people my age who are 
polyglot," Thielemann told me. "I stand with my feet on the ground of German 
music." But the fact is, as the critic said, that everything about Thielemann "sounds" 
German...he practices at the Deutsche Oper on a 1911 Bechstein, under a portrait of 
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Frederick the Great…He writes at a Bauhaus desk. He naps on a couch under a 
painting of a shutter on a window in a wall of the Charlottenburg Castle. He refers 
to himself…as "that very rare thing for Berlin . . . a conductor born here 132 
 
 
For all the “modernity” of the Deutsche Oper-one member described it as a “conveyor belt of 
new people and instantaneous successes” 133- Thielemann is rather traditional. While the 
Deutsche Oper is an international group, Thielemann is expressly a Berliner. His commitment to 
all things “German,” as depicted by the above excerpt, seems to better represent the Staatsoper’s  
Prussian roots. In one of his interviews Barenboim articulated the central issue of the merger, 
“instead of deciding priorities and saying one opera house…represents Germany and Berlin…we 
have a muddled attempt….” 134 This focus on “Germanness” can be seen both in Thielemann’s 
personal life and the Staatsoper’s commitment to their Prussian heritage. Both ensembles were 
created during different parts of Berlin’s history and therefore represent vastly separate images 
of the city. The forced separation of East and West Berlin only magnified the separateness of 
these two ensembles and their unique representations of “Germanness. When the two states were 
separated, there was less direct conflict over what constituted true Germanness as both states 
(and ensembles) could embrace their own concept separately. Reunification forced the groups to 
reevaluate this question. Not only were the Deutsche Oper and Staatsoper forced to compete for 
resources, but they were also forced to compete to represent the ideal image of Germany.  
  The merger of the Deutsche Oper and Staatsoper is not a simply competition over 
resources, nor is it simply a manifestation of reunification. The rivalry between these two groups 
is part of a centuries old competition between regional ensembles over prestige and 
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representation. The proximity of these two Operas only served to escalate the pressure. Journalist 
Laura Kramer articulated this phenomenon in her 2001 article The Opera House Wars, “The 
Opera House Wars were about another kind of politics. They were about putting a patent on 
Germanness. Or, you could say, they were about the Germanness of German music- who 
understands it, who gets to play it and how it should be performed…”135 In this way, 
Theilmann’s standing performance of Wagner at Bayreuth and Barenboim’s controversial 
performance in Israel represent this very phenomenon. Wagner is not only one of the best know 
German composers, but his music was central to the Third Reich. The opportunity to perform 
and revise Wagner is an opportunity to define modern “Germaneness”. The proposed merger of 
these two groups ultimately failed because it would have, as Stölzl hoped “dispose[d] of 
[Berlin’s] incipient opera wars.”136 Competition has been a central part of German cultural 
politics, from Fredrick the Great’s competition with Vienna, to competition between Nazi 
leaders’ ensembles, to the cultural side of the Cold War. A plan to eliminate this competition by 
creating one single “national” opera was doomed to fail, just as the first attempt at a National 
Theater did years before. Former Minister of Culture in Berlin, Michael Naumann proposed 
















	 A culture of competition and search for Germanness continues to effect the Opera Houses 
to this day. Though the Staatsoper and Deutsche Oper sidestepped the merger, the financial 
problems that motivated the proposal remained. In 2003, the Berlin government once again 
proposed a solution- this time acknowledging the criticism of the previous proposal. This plan 
intended to keep the Deutsche Oper, Staatsoper, and Komishe Oper separate, but coordinate 
them under the Berlin Opera Foundation. This foundation would be run by a general manager 
responsible for supervising the long term finances of the houses and encouraging them to 
coordinate programs to avoid overlap.138 This proposal also intended to reduce the opera budget 
from $123 to $112.5 million. This reduction would eliminate about about ten percent of the 
opera’s work force (about 220 jobs) though only eliminating eighteen orchestra players and five 
singers. 139 
 This plan acknowledged the separate identities of the ensembles and granted them 
relatively more autonomy than the previous proposal. Yet, the proposal was accompanied by a 
subtle threat. Christoph Stölzl’s successor, Thomas Flierl warned against protest by claiming that 
the federal government must approve funds for the transition and if those funds are not included 
in the federal budget, “the Deutsche Oper and Staatsoper will be merged and reduced to one 
orchestra, one chorus, and one ballet company.”140  
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 Of course, despite the warnings, protest ensued. Most of the complaints once again came 
from the Staatsoper who objected to the $2.5 million budget reduction and also claimed, “the 
government has stolen $7 million dollars which we earned from our tours.” 141 Though 
ultimately, the Foundation was created on January 1, 2004, 142 the continuous protests against 
cultural policies demonstrates the endurance of a deeply seeded rivalry with implications for 
German identity. The Staatsoper fought against the 2003 proposal even though they knew the 
alternative. The most recent proposal did not challenge their identity as it allowed them to 
maintain control over repertoire and did not force a union with the Deutsche Oper. Yet, the 
second proposal amplified the rivalry as it would equalize the ensembles’ funding, thus removing 
tangible “proof” of superiority over the Deutsche Oper.  
 The 2003 Berlin opera conflict is a mere retelling of a story that has taken place many 
times over the past hundred years. The initial feud during the Weimar Republic, the nationalist 
fueled party rivalry, the imposed Cold War antagonism, and even the failed merger of 2000 are 
all variations on the same theme. Competition between ensembles is constant and in fact, central 
to German culture. Whether the competition is over resources, prestige, or representations of 
Germanness depends on the political context, though in all the stated cases, it is a mixture of 
each. The most recent proposal exemplifies this. The Staatsoper was upset with the planned 
Foundation as it was a threat to both their resources and their prestige, as it would equalize the 
stipends for each group. Yet, as Barenboim explains, the dissent was also based on a concept of 
Germanness, “There is still an ideological problem between east and west…In East Berlin the 
Staatsoper was always the representative house and the Komishe Oper the people’s opera house. 
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Because Flierl is from the east, he doesn’t want to touch the Komishe Oper, and he won’t touch 
the Deutsche Oper for fear of being accused of being anti-western. So, without meaning to, they 
are about to destroy the only opera house that works.”143 Implicit in this statement is the belief 
that the Staatsoper represents—more than the other operas—true Germanness. This is where the 
East and West problem is relevant. Even nearly fifteen years after German reunification, there is 
still debate over which side represents true German identity.  
 The East-West conflict is only the most recent interpretation of Germany’s quest to 
define Germanness, it has been a project that has been launched and amended throughout 
German history. Some, like the Nazis, try to answer this question through the cultivation of 
cultural works that are expressly nationalistic. Others, like in the Opera Wars of 2000 use the 
legacies of existing cultural institutions to promote a certain idea of Germanness. Ultimately, it is 
a question that may never have a concrete answer as identity is fluid and perceptions of 
Germanness are bound to change. In the meantime, German ensembles will continue to compete 




































1. West German woman, children’s theater teacher, and performer, born in Stuttgart, 
lived in West Berlin since the early 1960’s: 
 
The biggest conflict between East and West was for that [single] generation. There was double of 
everything- orchestras, theaters, etc.  and in East Germany there was far more than in the West. 
While a theater in the West may have twenty performers who perform in five plays a month, in 
the east there may have been two hundred performers, each who performed in maybe two 
[shows] per month. After reunification, the people who were at the top were able to “move up”- 
especially in the west. I was in my peak at forty-five and successful. The problem came for other 
older performers who were not the best because they missed out on roles. For someone who is 
twenty or twenty-five, that is not a problem. They have another chance. But for someone who is 
like me, that was a problem. It was a little more difficult for people in the east, especially those 
who were not in the top. For this reason, maybe this generation blamed reunification. Those who 
were the losers of reunification supported the left. To this day, it is a party of old people and easy 
to forget about, but now there are some more young people who are supporting Putin.  
 
In my theater groups it was very obvious to tell who was from east and who was from west 
through the way they spoke, how often they spoke, things like that. Now it is a little less obvious. 
Perhaps it would take two hours [to discern]. 
 
Before reunification, all Germans must assume guild for the holocaust, regardless of if it was 
before our time. SO Germany used an “umbrella of guilt” as sort of a defense mechanism to 
show…the rest of Europe “we are guilty” but then to have modern discussions underneath. After 
reunification this was no more.  
 
Reunification and how quickly the East modernized was somewhat of a shock to other European 
countries. For so long we were comfortable under the presence of the Americans that a bigger 
and stronger modern Germany was startling. It wasn’t just Germany and the Baltic states that 
were affected by the fall of communism- it created a stronger Europe. 
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2. West German man, born in southern Germany, moved to Berlin in the 1970’s, cellist 
for the DSO: 
 
“I was born in Southern Germany in 1955 where I went to music school I moved to Berlin to 
escape the Draft. They granted me four years to study but it was really a race to leave before they 
“got you”. In Berlin there was an agreement that you could not be drafted because of the other 
powers. I joined the DSO (Deutsches Symphonie Orchester Berlin). It was founded by 
Americans and started as their radio orchestra but has had several name changes over the past 
several years. It changed because it was too similar to an east German ensemble and was 
confusing. Both groups played similar music and had similar names. The Japanese once asked 
why the same orchestra toured twice a year. 
 
After the fall of the wall, money meant the fusion of orchestras including the DSO and Rundfunk 
radio. This was not popular because jobs would have been lost but it ultimately didn’t happen 
because several different funding sources couldn’t agree. East Germany lost lots of orchestras 
and groups during reunification but the West had lost many decades before due to an economic 
downturn.  
 
Differences in East and West German orchestras can be seen by way of interaction. West 
German orchestras were much more democratic while east German orchestras were 
authoritarian. A colleague of mine was in a former East German orchestra. He was complaining 
about some aspect of the orchestra and I suggested to write a letter to the director. My college 
was shocked. In this orchestra one must first take to orchestra leaders and then go up the 
different levels. It was very hierarchical. Barenboim too is an example of this East German 
authoritarianism. Some people call him “the lion” because it is either his way or no way.  
 
There was also a different style of playing in the East and West. In the West, musicians were 
influenced by Russian-Jewish musicians who traveled to America and established this school of 
efficient technique and brilliant sound. The was adopted in the West. In the East the traditional 
“darker” German sound- longer vibrato, etc.- was popular and you could hear the difference. I 
56	
don’t know why [East Germans] didn’t go to Moscow to study as there were many good Russian 
teachers there. 
 
East German orchestras toured in other parts of the world. Only fifty out of two- hundred for 
example in an orchestra were allowed to go. Often, they were Stasi or had strong family ties. No 
divorced people were allowed to go for fear of desertion. Some musicians fled once in other 
countries though there was heavy state supervision. For example, I heard of one man in Japan 
who paid a cab driver to take him to the German Embassy, but the cab driver took him to the 
wrong one. What happened? I don’t know. Maybe he was punished or not allowed to travel or no 
longer in the orchestra. Another man fled only one year before the wall fell and joined the DSO. 
His family had many disadvantages during this time. They were not allowed to study, not 
allowed to work, etc.  
… 
German identity is defined by state subsides of music- it allows more people to go [to 
















3. American expat in Berlin, recently retired pianist for the Deutsche Oper:  
 
Before reunification, the Deutsche Oper was the only show in town. It made lots of money and 
even had around two or three separate performances a week. Suddenly, the wall fell and no one 
expected. Berlin was left with three operas and none of them could really be closed down. They 
couldn’t close the Komishe Oper as it was the “heilige Kuh”. They couldn’t close the Staatsoper 
because it was historic and also somewhat of a “helige Kuh”. And they couldn’t close the 
Deutsche Oper because it was successful. The biggest difference between the Staatsoper and the 
Deutsche Oper was the performers. The Staatsoper’s singers were all friends of Daniel 
Barenboim while the Deutsche Oper directors knew who the good singers were and booked those 
that would draw a crowd.  
 
Of the three ensembles, the Staatsoper is the oldest and most mature. It’s also the most 
expensive, but they have more money anyway. Their claim to fame is their opera house. 
Barenboim is like the king, like an emperor or dictator. The Deutsche Oper is a young ensemble 
with lots of money. It is very open and a good working atmosphere. They can’t fire you after 15 
years. They make their money by being fast moving. It is like a conveyor belt of new people and 
instantaneous successes. They book very beautiful singers and some of them can actually sing! 
The Deutsche Oper but also have a scholarship program. There are two scholarships for 
American singers, one for European singers and one for Germans each year. They don’t pay very 
much and cast smaller roles but are a way to attract younger and international singers. The 
Komishe Oper is young and not very well known. I know they work their singers really hard and 
have good connections to Russian occupiers. They newest Komishe Oper director put on a new 
production by Bietio. It was set in the Red Light district with obvious sexuality. It was crazy 
violent, really very extreme. The people from the Old DDR watched it and were incensed. A lot 
of them left and the Komische Oper lost something like twenty percent of its old clients. But, this 





4. Matthias Glander- clarinetist, former Orchestrvorstand of the Staatsoper, and 
member of the Staatsoper since 1983  
 
I was from east; I couldn’t go to west Berlin. Staatsoper for me was the highest level of playing 
and tradition. One more thing, that was very important was that this orchestra was playing in two 
worlds: opera world and concert world. From the beginning of time the orchestra was two faces, 
like the Vienna philharmonic. This is something specific to this orchestra. The Deutsche Oper 
orchestra is a reinesoper orchestra- concerts only three to four times a year. But we are serious. 
We go on tour. We’re going to Europe next week, Japan next year, we played the Mahler cycle 
in NY…. 
 
The orchestra was able to travel before as a Botschafter- a cultural ambassador for the GDR . 
Went on tour with Opera House since the 1960s and 70s. went to Paris, Italy, Great Britian, 
Japan (who had a big connection from east Germany at this time because Japanese are very 
interested in German culture and German music). I was on tour the first time in 1985. The 
orchestra was going to England and it was my first time to go West. It was a special thing, 
typically the people in the east couldn’t go. It was forbidden becase of the iron wall. For me, it 
was a really great feeling to jump over the wall. Of course we took a flight. Of course it was not 
allowed…we had to fly north and fly through Denmark and then back for political reasons.  
 
Reunification was really great. Everyone was high [read excited?] and it was a party. But a little 
bit later, a half a day, you know, after a big party you have a headache. There were lots of 
problems-especially in Berlin. Other people in the south didn’t realize the problems we had in 
berlin. The mentality of the people was so different. If you are coming from a free society, you 
are much more self-aware, and these people [not from the west] were a lot more shy. People 
started a little bit to fight within the society. The west wouldn’t give something to the east, and 
the east waited for support. We got Barenboim in 1992. Before he was chief conductor of the 
Bastille Orchestra but there was political trouble and intrigue against him. He was fired. Our 
former conductor was very sick and could not continue because of Parkinsons, so he quit his 
duty and the position was free. We asked Barenboim to come and do a rehearsal. Afterwards he 
said, “wow, what a wonderful sound. I remember this sound from the Israeli philharmonic of the 
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1950s” (all the Jewish players were refugees from Germany) It was great for him to have this old 
German cultural sound because orchestras in the west were much more mixed- American style, 
French style, British style. But this old German style was a very special sound- a lot of vibrato, 
etc. It’s a unique thing. And he was very happy about it and he wanted to develop this 
sound/style and on the one had to hold this tradition and on the other hand make us a modern 
orchestra able to play French music and Russian music (Russians style). But this German sound, 
this good German sound is something that was really special.  
 
We are the former east German orchestra and we have the old state opera house since 1742. 
Fredrick the greats’ first order was to build up an opera house because he was very interested in 
cultural things…the orchestra was already there since 1500s. He decided not only to play 
concerts, but also operas. SO this opera has a very old tradition in berlin. Since eighteenth 
century it was the musical center of berlin and created a bürgerliches Musikleben. Bach 
composed the the Brandenburg concerts. Since 1918 when the empire was stopped, it changed 
from Hofkapelle to Staatskappelle. In the end of the nineteenth century more and more 
orchestras were established and a new opera house was build 1912- Deutsche Oper. More too-
Oper Komic and Metropol theater for operettas. Then WWII the result was dividing Germany 
into four parts and the same with berlin. But we already had three opera houses in berlin, SO-
DO- opera comic- and one more maybe? 
 
The situation we had before war was same as after. Then we had cold war and when the wall 
came down, it was normal. Just the financial situation around 2000 was a reason to think about 
some collaboration and some fusion. There was a Bankenskandal and Berlin was becoming very 
poor. So then they thought let’s put together everybody. But it doesn’t make sense to bring 
together different ensembles, different orchestras together that don’t have any connection- any 
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